PHI 350 - Seminar in Philosophy

Instructor: Robb

Are we living in a computer simulation? How could we know? How much of what we value, if anything, would be lost if this simulation hypothesis were true? We look at these difficult questions, with the goal of clarifying important philosophical concepts such as reality, truth, knowledge, and value. Readings are primarily from philosophy, but we will also look to science and literature for illumination.

Spring 2023: The Nature of Perception

Instructor: Busch

Say you see an apple resting on a table before you. What is it for you to see in this case? This might seem an odd question. The temptation is to answer with a causal story from the natural sciences: Light reflected from a material surface hits photoreceptor cells in your retina, which send electrochemical signals through your optic nerve and thalamus to your brain’s cerebral cortex, inducing a complex neural state. Indeed, this may be part of what it is for you to see the apple. But it seems to leave out something essential: your experience as of a distinct red and round thing in space. Here is where our philosophical problem begins. What is to have an experience with such character?

This question is puzzling for the following reason. On the one hand, your experience is directed toward redness and roundness “out there” distinct from you and your brain-as would be the case even if you were hallucinating without an apple really there. On the other hand, the character of your experience depends on what goes on in your brain; e.g., a different shade of red, a different color entirely, or perhaps no color at all would appear had you a different neural state. Our philosophical account of perception must reconcile these two seemingly contrary features of experience, which apply also to sense modalities other than visual perception like touching, hearing, tasting, and smelling.

Using primary readings from contemporary philosophy of perception, and Adam Pautz’s bookPerception as a guide, we will explore four different solutions. (1) The Sense-Datum View: Having an experience with a certain character is being immediately aware of mental images. (2) The Internal Physical State View: Having an experience with a certain character is nothing but being in a certain brain state. (3) The Representational View: Having an experience with a certain character is representing the external world as being a certain way. (4) Naïve Realism: Having an experience with a certain character is being aware of the actual character of external things.

Satisfies the seminar requirement for the Philosophy major.

Prerequisites & Notes
This course can be repeated for credit given sufficiently distinct topics: check with the department chair. (Fall, Spring)